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BOOK REVIEWS
Der Tatbestand der Liige [The Operative Facts of Lying]. By Walter Gustav
Becker. Tfibingen: 3. C. B. Mohr, 1948. Pp. 63.
In this little book, the author, a former judge and now professor of law at the
recently established University of Mayence, gives expression to his deeply felt
pain at what Kierkegaard once called "the dishonesty of modern times." While
it may be doubted whether other periods have been marked by any greater
degree of truthfulness, it is undoubtedly correct that untruthfulness has rarely
had at its disposal any tools as powerful as those of the modern instruments of
mass communication, and whether it has ever been able to indulge in such
orgies as those presented by the propaganda of modern totalitarian states. The
author had to live through the experience of Nazi propaganda in which every
kind of untruthfulness was used in the most unscrupulous ways and with an
unprecedented degree of systematization and technical perfection. In his pres-
ent book he has tried to analyze these methods and to show how, in the final
accounting, the entire system of National Socialist appeal to the masses was
deceitful and dishonest. Significant attempts at developing a science of propa-
ganda analysis have been made in this country in recent years. A different and
somewhat devious method is being used by Doctor Becker, who is neither a
psychologist nor a sociologist. As a legal scholar he uses a legal method. How,
so he asks himself, would a law maker have to define the concept of "lie" if he
would try to establish it as a criminal offense. This statement of the problem
remains a purely theoretical one, however. Doctor Becker disavows any inten-
tion to advocate the enactment of an amendment to the criminal code, and he
can thus omit any discussion of its social desirability. As a consequence his
attempt at defining in legalistic terms a purely ethical concept appears some-
what artificial and unreal. However, his typology of the lie as based upon illus-
trative examples taken from the propaganda practice of the Third Reich, and a
special instance of sophisticated untruthfulness as presented by one of the
accused of the Nuremberg trials,' reveals insights into the complex forms behind
which untruthfulness can try to hide. His concepts of the patent and latent lies
of evaluation (Wertungsliige) and of the "life lie" (Lebensliige) as basic dis-
crepancy between a man's real and professed ethical ideals may well be useful
for a science of propaganda analysis. However, the essay form of presentation,
the frequent references to philosophical thought (the relevancy of which is not
always obvious), and the peculiar method of inquiry, will not facilitate such
utilization.
MAX RiEInSTEiN*
x Within the framework of the book, this instance plays but a minor role. Whether or not a
particular statement made by the person in question had some basis in fact, is irrelevant for
the author's purposes. In a review of the book in 2 German Books 125 (r949), Professor von
Hentig blames the author for not having investigated the objective correctness of that state-
ment. Such an investigation would not seem to have been called for by the purpose of Doctor
Becker's book.
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